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Chapter 7

The Difference Creation Makes:
Relative Timelessness Reconsidered
Alan G. Padgett
The relationship between God and time may seem an obscure subject to some. Yet
the more one studies it, the more convinced one becomes that this doctrine plays a
key role in our grasp of the relationship between God and the world. I personally
have been fascinated by this subject for several decades of my life, involving as it
does physics, philosophy, and theology. How we understand God’s relationship to
the world, in turn, is a central part of any theistic worldview. So despite the seeming
obscurity of the topic to some Christian thinkers, the doctrine of divine eternity is
an important part of any fully developed doctrine of God.
In this chapter I will consider the difference the act of creation and continuing
creating makes to our understanding of God’s eternity. We begin by looking again
at the idea that God’s eternity is relatively timeless, borrowing the term ‘relative’
from modern physics, especially relativity theory. I will also set forth the ways in
which my thinking has changed since 1989 when I finished my doctoral work at
Oxford which I later published as God, Eternity and the Nature of Time.1 Because
this third viewpoint of relative timelessness is still new to many philosophers and
theologians, even those who work on the topic of time and eternity, I will take a few
moments to review the evidence and arguments that led me to this conclusion and
sketch out the basic viewpoint.
7.1 What Is Relative Timelessness?
Normally scholars distinguish between two views of the relationship between God
and time, the everlasting model (sometimes called ‘sempiternal’) and the absolute
timelessness or atemporal model. As we know, the debate has been framed histori
cally between these two views, with problems being pointed out for each position by
its opponent. For some time now I have been promoting an alternative model: God
is timeless relative to the created spacetime cosmos, but also in some ways temporal.
With respect for the great doctors of the church in the past, I have found neither
Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time [1992],
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the everlasting nor the atemporal models finally satisfactory. I have promoted a
third alternative which one hopes preserves key insights from both of the traditional
views.
The basic picture of relative timelessness is this:
(1)

(2)
(3)

God’s time is infinite and immeasurable. Because they are involved in created
frames of reference and depend upon stable laws of nature, measured time
words like ‘day’ or ‘week’ do not properly apply to eternity. All points of our
created time are simultaneous with some points of God’s eternity, but our
spacetime universe does not measure God’s infinite temporality.
God’s life is in no way defective or undermined by the passage of time. God
is the Lord of time, not its prisoner.
Because God is a dynamic and changing being, God is still temporal in some
sense: God is immutable in essence, but changing in inter-relationship with
the world and with us. Because God is a changing being, God has to be
temporal to some degree. For this reason there are intervals within God’s
life, but those intervals have no specific or intrinsic temporal measure.

This viewpoint has recently been adopted and modified by Gary DeWeese2 under
the name ‘omnitemporality’. I’m happy to accept that as another way of talking
about this third model. Having introduced this third perspective, we turn to alterna
tive viewpoints on divine eternity and survey some of their problems.
7.2 The Biblical Witness
Over recent decades I have moved more fully into the discipline of Christian doc
trine (i. e., systematic and moral theology). I have come to appreciate more than I
did before the importance of allowing biblical theology and the biblical narrative
of God, creation, Israel, Jesus, and the early church to give a decisive shape to the
doctrine of God. What is important here is not only the words used for eternity in
the Bible, or even the isolated sayings about God and time, but also the character
of God in the biblical story. When we put together all of these kinds of sources, it
becomes quite clear that the Christian Bible presents us with a view of God in which
God is not absolutely timeless but rather eternal in the sense of everlasting. Psalm
90:2 is a good example: ‘Before the mountains were born, and You gave birth to
the earth and world, from eternity to eternity You are God.’ The Hebrew word for
‘eternity’ here (olam) means a long period of time (not a timeless eternity) and is
often translated as everlasting.’ This is consistent with the narratives concerning
God and Israel or the Church. For example, the prophet Isaiah (speaking for God)
proclaims: ‘I the Lord, the first and the last, I am He’ (Is 41:4). A God who exists
from the first to the last is an everlasting Lord, not a timeless one. This is the view
point of the vast majority of biblical scholarship, especially since Oscar Cullmann’s
important monograph, Christ and Time [l950]. For this reason as a Christian
2

DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time [2004].
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theologian I believe that the everlasting model is the one we should begin with
in thinking about God and time in the discipline of systematic theology. We need
reasons to modify this view. The classical tradition has long provided such reasons,
of course, but they did not always begin with the priority of the Scriptures and
historical reality of Jesus Christ for the doctrine of God, the way many contempo
rary theologians (I among them) think we should.
My friend and esteemed colleague William Lane Craig, one of the world’s great
experts on time, eternity, and the nature of God, has recently argued that the Bible
is more ambiguous on this topic than one might think at first glance.3 He sees the
biblical teaching of creatio ex nihilo as setting up or implying an absolute beginning
to time. I do agree with Craig that creation out of nothing is a biblical doctrine.
There is good support for the doctrine of creation out of nothing in passages like 2
Macc 7:25, Rom 4:7 and Heb 11:3 (cf. 2 En 24:2). What I cannot agree with is that
creation out of nothing is taught in Gen 1. Even if we read the opening sentence
of the Bible as an independent sentence which makes a kind of title for the whole
section, and not as a temporal clause as some Bible translations have it, Gen 1 does
not itself teach creation out of nothing.4 The presence of a formless waste and the
waters of the deep lead to the conclusion that this chapter is teaching a creation
out of chaos, as almost all academic exegetes will agree. Old Testament scholar
Terry Fretheim writes, ‘The word beginning probably does not refer to the absolute
beginning of all things, but to the beginning of the ordered creation, including
the temporal order’.5 The evidence for a creation out of nothing in Gen 1 is too
weak to support Craigs conclusions. What we might find in the text of Gen 1,
and its seven-day creation, is the beginning of ordered time or measured time.
As John Edward Wright puts this, ‘with Gen 1 cosmic time and historical time
begin’.6 That Gen 1 implies an absolute beginning to time itself, i. e., to metaphysical
time or pure duration, is a conclusion which goes beyond the biblical data. This
point about Gen 1 which we must press against Craig does introduce an important
distinction: the difference between (1) measured time, that is cosmic or physical
time, the time of science, clocks, and calendars, which does begin with the origin
of the spacetime cosmos; and (2) metaphysical time or pure duration, which may
not have any beginning at all.
The Bible does unambiguously point to a God who is temporal but also eternal
(everlasting). The burden of proof for theologians should be on the side of a timeless
God. So what are the problems with the everlasting viewpoint? We do seem to have
some sense of the transcendence of God, requiring that She be outside of any merely
created category. For example, we hold that God is beyond space or spaceless, and
is infinite in being while all other things are finite. The main problem with the
everlasting model is not logical consistency but theological inadequacy. Given our
notion of God as an infinite, personal creator, we would expect God to transcend
3
4
5
6

Craig, Time and Eternity [200l], pp. 14-20.
Contra Copan and Craig, Creation Out of Nothing [2004].
Fretheim, Genesis [1994], p. 342.
Wright, Cosmogony, Cosmology [2006], p. 755.
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time in some way. Merely knowing the future, and living forever, is not enough to
satisfy this demand. Another important point is pressed by recent developments
in physics. We would join with St Augustine and many others to insist that time
in some sense is a created category which came into existence with the physical
universe. Space and time - or we had better say spacetime - has a beginning, but
God does not. Spacetime is warped by the presence of matter; but God is not. Thus
God must be beyond time as we know it in science, at least in some way. This is
a continuing problem for an everlasting view of eternity. I will argue that what
we will call in general ‘physical time’ began with the creation of the universe, and
distinguish this from a ‘metaphysical time’: a time which can go by without change,
without material things, and without laws of nature. This allows us to affirm that
spacetime had a beginning in time without thinking that metaphysical time had a
beginning.

7.3 Problems with Timeless Eternity
What, then, of an absolutely timeless God, that is, what about the classical tradition
of divine eternity as totum simul? Logically one problem with the classical view
that keeps appearing is the attempt to write temporality back onto the being of the
One who is utterly timeless. This often happens when thinking of eternity as if all of
time could actually be at one time. In the actual world both the reality of temporality
and the process of becoming between things and events enters into the core being
of created reality. When we abstract from this dynamic reality in mathematics and
physics or in theology and philosophy we can discover important truths but are
leaving behind an essential part of the actual world. The standard classical model of
all of time being “at once” before a timeless God leaves behind something important
about the world God has created, namely, the dynamic character of time and history.
Recent philosophers, including our esteemed colleagues Eleonore Stump and
Brian Leftow, have attempted to create a model of eternity that is consistent with the
A-theory or dynamic theory of time. I do agree that the classical model of a timeless
creator and sustainer of the world is internally coherent, but only when we reject or
abandon the dynamic theory of time for a stasis or B-theory. Some philosophers are
willing to embrace this conclusion. As Katherin Rogers recently wrote, ‘ [C] riticisms
of the tenseless view of time are not powerful enough to necessitate abandoning
the venerable tradition of an eternal God’7 Unlike some critics, I believe that the
atemporal model is logically consistent, but only when one adopts a stasis theory of
time can such a God interact with creation.8

7 Rogers, Omniscience, Eternity, and Freedom [1996], p. 408. This is also found in her new
book, TheAnselmian Approach [1997].
8 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time [1992], pp. 76-81.
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Because a timeless God is alive, God’s life will have a timeless, ‘atemporal exten
sive mode of existence’.9 As was argued by John Duns Scotus in the Middle Ages,
God’s being has succession only in a conceptual sense, not in a temporal one.10 But
such a God will not be able to change in order to interact with a created, contingent
world that comes into being and passes out of being, wich the process or dynamic
theory of time demands. The main difference between process and stasis (or A- and
B-) theories has to do with temporal passage. Imagine a time T, in the far future, and
an event E which (let us say) will certainly happen at T. If we take the combination,
£-at-T, we can get a sense of the difference between the process and stasis views.
For the stasis view, £-at-T is real always. Of course, E is not real now, but then
neither view thinks it is. Rather, the stasis view believes that E is always real at T
(and only at T). The process theory, however, denies that E is always real at T. E is
only fully real when T is now, when T is the present moment. Nothing is real-at-T
unless T is present. Of course, on the process theory, you can contrast the abstract
set of all things past, present, and future that will ever be real with illusions, myths,
and other non-real things. But within that set, for the process view, only present
things are fully real. Past things used to be real, and future things will be real. If
this view of time is correct, then either a timeless God does the same thing forever,
and cannot interact with time; or God must change somehow over time not merely
in appearance but in reality. For the action of God sustains all things in their very
being-in-becoming.
Some esteemed and learned philosophers, whose work deserves more careful
analysis than I can give it here, have sought to avoid this conclusion. I am thinking
especially of Eleonore Stump and Brian Leftow. They have sought to make coherent
a timeless model of divine eternity with a dynamic theory of temporal passage. They
want to press the point that God co-exists with every moment of time while not
becoming temporal himself. What we need, however, is not mere co-existence but
a theory of direct divine action in which God acts upon and interacts with temporal
things at moments which do not and cannot all exist at once. By thinking that past,
present and future things can somehow exist all at once, we do violence to the idea
that reality is fully temporal. Only present things are fully real; past things used to
9 Stump and Kretzmann, Atemporal Duration [1987], p. 215. Stump and Kretzmann later
insist that their language of a ‘timeless now’, a ‘timeless simultaneity’ and a ‘timeless duration’
are meant to be analogies, in Stump and Kretzmann, Eternity, Awareness, and Action
[1992], pp. 463-82, esp. 464-5. Stump and Kretzmann use terms like timeless ‘duration’,
timeless ‘now’, and timeless ‘simultaneity’ because they wish to retain some aspects of
the ordinary predicates. But why not use ordinary words when possible? Especially in
specialist publications (like theirs), it is better to use ordinary terms in univocal predica
tion, to avoid confusion and hasty conclusions. For example, if they had used ‘timeless
co-existence’ instead of‘£T-simultaneity’ in the publications, a great deal of confusion (and
a few errors on their part) could have been avoided.
10 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I [1950], I, d. 9 8c d. 43. This work is sometimes entitled Opus
Oxoniense, but is called Ordinatio in the beautiful modern critical edition of Duns Scotus,
Opera Omnia [1950].
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be real and future things will be real. Past and future are not fully real, and to think
they are is to abstract from and leave behind a key element of created existence in
the actual world.
What I am saying is that the very idea that all times co-exist timelessly with God
in eternity is incoherent. First of all, things which exist in time cannot co-exist
timelessly. Nothing that is temporal can also be timeless. In the second place, all
times cannot and do not co-exist in any sense - and certainly not ‘timelessly5 or ‘in
eternity5. Different times are not all present, and only present things are fully real
(on the process view). Therefore, they cannot co-exist with present things.
The Special Theory of Relativity does not change this logical fact, but forces us to
say, ‘present according to what system of measurement?5 An event may be present
in one system of measurement, but past in another. However, a timeless God does
not have a system of measurement. God co-exists with the true present, that is, the
real moment of becoming, in the life of everything in the universe. If the physical
universe as a whole is in the process of becoming (as the process theory demands),
then so is each object (really existing thing) in it. Even a timeless God must await
the future of any and all objects in the universe, in order to act directly upon future
(non-existent) episodes of that object. Thus a timeless God must do exactly the same
thing forever, and cannot change to interact with a changing reality. This argument,
of course, presupposes a process theory of time.
Defenders of Gods timeless being are often captured by a picture. This is a picture
of God, high and lifted up, seeing all of time at once, in the way an observer on a
high hill can see the whole of a road at once. The problem here is that only one step
of the road exists, even for the observer. The typical abstraction of thinking about
all events forever in spacetime is just that: an abstraction. In reality, on the process
theory, time is not like space. I have elsewhere given fuller time to a consideration
and critique of their theories, and cannot repeat all of that here.11 Interestingly,
John Duns Scotus considered similar ideas in his Lectura centuries ago, and rejected
them, making the following comment: ‘If all future beings were present to God
according to their actual existence, it would be impossible for God to cause them
to exist anew.’12 Since timeless existence is so very different from temporal being,
even if every event existed in Gods timeless “frame of reference” then God would
have to re-create all events within the flow of temporal passage - which is absurd.
Just what is so bad with the stasis theory, then? If we have a strong attach
ment to atemporal eternity, can we not choose to hold on to a stasis theory of
time? Here my only comment would be that we should allow philosophy of science
and metaphysics to put forward the best theory. It is inappropriate for doctrinal
theology or philosophy of religion to dictate in advance the conclusion that other
11 Padgett, Eternity [1993], pp. 219-23. Some of these same criticisms can be found in
Craig, The Special Theory of Relativity [1994], pp. 19-37.
12 ‘Si omniafutura essentpraesentia Deo secundum eorum actualem existentiam, impossibile
esset Deo causare aliquid de novo.' (Duns Scotus, Lectura I [1950], d. 39, q. 5, sec. 28) There
is an English translation and commentary on this Distinction, entitled Contingency and
Freedom [1994].
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sciences or disciplines must embrace. Coherence with other truths is an important
criterion for any theory, including our theology of eternity. My own work in the
philosophy of time has convinced me that the process theory of time is correct.
Thus I cannot embrace the traditional model of timeless eternity. Of course I respect
those who come to different conclusions, but I would argue with their metaphysical
understanding of temporal reality.
7.4 Timelessness sans Creation
Recently Craig has come up with an interesting twist on the traditional view that
takes seriously the dynamic character of creation. His new view is that God is
timelessly eternal before the first moment of creation and the first change (and here
‘before’ must be a logical or causal before, not a temporal one). God then becomes
a temporal being with the creation of time itself. I have a problem with this model,
but thinking through Craig’s arguments has also forced me to change my mind in
one respect which I will spell out later.
The problem I have with Craig’s model has to do with the necessary connections
between time and change. Bringing all of the cosmos into existence at or soon after
the first change is a decisive event in the history of God and of all existence. In
order for this to happen, something has to change. For all eternity past, even before
all creation, God is at least capable of changing in order to make reality be in the
first place. This change cannot be attributed to the world, for the world did not yet
exist back then. I have argued for some time that there is a necessary relationship
between time and change. It is a principle that goes like this: necessarily, if change is
possible for something then that thing is temporal in some way. Earlier I spelled out
this relationship in a long argument involving modal counterfactual logic. I have
since then come upon a much shorter argument which I would like to present here
for the first time.
First, I will propose as a principle of reason confirmed by experience the follow
ing proposition: without time nothing can change. Time and change are not the
same thing, and time can possibly go by without any change happening. But when
we imagine an infinitely thin slice of some event, in which no duration, no temporal
extension occurs at all, then change simply cannot happen at that instant. Change
takes time to happen, and in fact some philosophers have gone so far as to define
change as an entity having different properties at different times.
Yet we have not gone far enough. Where there is no duration, that is, no tempo
ral extension of any kind, then change is not even possible. It is not just that as a
matter of fact no change can happen in a durationless instant. It is metaphysically
impossible for any change to take place. Imagine such an instantaneous time slice of
a colloquium. In that snap-shot of time, nothing can change simply because change
takes time. In that durationless instant change is not even possible.
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One more modal point needs to be made. The principle I am speaking of does
not just apply in the actual world. It is a necessary truth, flowing from the very idea
of change itself. It applies in all possible worlds of necessity. This gets us to our first
proposition. If we let X range across things or events, then:
1.

2.

Necessarily, if a duration does not occur for X then change is not possible
for X. In symbols this would be:
(1) n[-iD(x) -*■ -»O C(x)]
Where D is a symbol for duration, and C for change. Now in a short logical
step or two we can reach the principle we want:
Necessarily, if change is possible for X then a duration occurs for X. Again,
in symbols:
(2) n[OC(x) - D(x)]

Applying principle (2) to the case of God before the first change, that is, before
creation, we get this truth: If God is even capable of change at all, then God is in
some way temporal. When we reflect upon the very first change in the life of God,
the momentous change of bringing about the physical spacetime universe in the
beginning, that change belongs to God alone. So God must be capable of change
for Craig, even without or before creation. Yet principle (2) means that God must
still be temporal in some way even apart from creation, if it is even possible for God
to change. Principle (2) is also the reason that I define metaphysical time as the
dimension of the possibility of change.
While we should not accept Craig’s viewpoint because of the problem I have just
outlined, we can go pretty far along with him. I now think that we should restrict
the term ‘relative timelessness’ to the non-finite eternity of God before creation and
before all change. Before creation, although time does go by there was no change,
i. e., no alteration in the infinite being and blessed rest of the triune God. There were
no true intervals or metrics to mark off the passage of time: just pure duration, pure
being without change. God only changes to bring about the first moment of physical
time and of all creation with it. Once God does bring about a world, then things
change for God as well as for creatures. What about God’s eternity after creation?
I would now accept the term ‘omnitemporal’ from Gary DeWeese, in which God’s
time or eternity transcends physical time by being infinite and immeasurable. So I
would change Craig’s model only in this respect: before the first change, God is rela
tively timeless, and also contingently without change (but still capable of changing).
With creation God becomes omnitemporal, entering into a relative change with us,
while still being immutable in those essential properties which set off God as fully
divine.
I have argued in this chapter that both of the traditional notions of eternity
have their problems. In dialogue with Craig I have proposed a modified version
of relative timelessness for divine eternity. Prior to creation, God is changeless and
free of temporal measure or temporal decay, that is, before creation God is relatively
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timeless. After creation, God is essentially immutable but changes in relationship
with a dynamic world of time. In other words, after creation God is omnitemporal.
For all eternity God is in some ways temporal, yet is never bound by time. Thus in
dialogue with my colleagues and critics I have learned to alter my earlier position,
and so develop and strengthen the notion of relative timelessness.

